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Abstract
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-
lowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase
votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign
promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We ana-
lyze the role of the parties' budget constraints and voter preferences in determining
the winner and the payments to voters.
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11 Introduction
The practice of vote buying appears in many societies and organizations, and in di®erent
forms. Obvious examples include direct payments to voters, donations to a legislator's
campaign by special interest groups, the buying of the voting shares of a stock, and
the promise of speci¯c programs or payments to voters conditional on the election of a
candidate. While we generally think of the trade of goods as being welfare improving,
the buying and selling of votes is often (albeit not always) viewed as undesirable.
Our purpose in this paper is to explore the consequences of vote buying. The aim
is both to enhance the understanding of those forms of vote buying that are widely
practiced, such as lobbying legislators and making campaign promises, and to shed light
on the hypothetical question of what might happen if vote buying were allowed where
it is currently prohibited. The latter question can of course help us think about the
rationale behind current social conventions. To do so we study how vote buying would
function in an environment in which it is allowed and free of stigma. We focus on the
following questions.
² How do voters' preferences (over outcomes and over how they vote) and bidders'
budgets a®ect the outcome of the election?
² How does the institutional environment|whether parties can purchase votes with
up-front payments or can only make campaign promises|a®ect the outcome?
² Is the outcome with vote buying e±cient, and how is this a®ected by allowing
bidders' budgets to be raised from donations?
We address these questions using the following model. There is a ¯nite population
of voters choosing between two competing parties. Each of the parties is interested in
obtaining a majority of the votes while spending as little as possible, subject to not
exceeding its budget. We examine two scenarios: one in which the parties only compete
in campaign promises (that are contingent upon the outcome of the election, but not upon
the actual vote); and the other where parties also compete in up-front vote buying (where
the payment is contingent on the vote, but not on the outcome). In both scenarios the
parties make o®ers in a sequential and alternating bidding process. Although voters are
not formally modeled as players, their assumed behavior is motivated by considerations
of utility maximization.
The answers to the ¯rst two questions raised above are intertwined. The identity of
the winning party and the distribution of payments to voters depend not just on voter
2preferences and party budgets, but also critically on whether up-front vote buying is
permitted or only campaign promises are allowed.
First, when parties compete only through campaign promises, the total payments
received by voters tend to be substantially higher than under up-front vote buying. The
intuition is that, with up-front buying, the party that knows it will lose in equilibrium
will not wish to buy any votes since those must be paid for up-front, but will be happy
to bid for votes with campaign promises that are only paid upon winning.1
Second, when parties compete only through campaign promises, the voters whose
preferences matter are a speci¯c subset of the voters near the median voter. In contrast,
with up-front vote buying, the preferences of all voters are important in determining who
wins.
Third, the trade-o® between a party's budget and the intensity of the voters' pref-
erence for that party also di®ers across these two regimes. Roughly speaking, when
up-front buying is allowed, increasing any voter's preference for voting for one party by
the equivalent of $2 has the same e®ect on whether that party will win as increasing its
budget by $1. In this sense, money is worth twice as much to a party as being liked
by an equivalent amount. In contrast, when only campaign promises are allowed, a $1
increase in a party's budget has the same e®ect as increasing a voter's preference for
this party by the equivalent of $1 if the voter is one of the key \near-median" voters,
and $0 otherwise (as such changes in other voters' preferences are inconsequential under
campaign promises).
Fourth, in the equilibrium on which we focus, in the game with only campaign
promises the winner ends up with a marginal majority. With up-front vote buying,
the winner either maintains its initial majority (possibly a super- majority) or ends up
with a just-marginal majority.
Fifth, under campaign promises voter preferences over ¯nal outcomes matter, while
under up-front vote buying, in an important subset of the cases, voter preferences over
¯nal outcomes do not have a signi¯cant e®ect. Due to the way that we set up the model,
this insight follows easily from our assumptions. But in fact it is an important insight
that has broader validity.
The answer to the e±ciency question is that, regardless of the vote buying protocol,
the outcome of the election could generally be Pareto ine±cient. This follows since in
either situation voters' preferences are not fully accounted for in determining the winner
1Of course, as this follows from ex ante certainty about who wins and loses, it relies on the assumption
that there is complete information about the budgets.
3of the election. However, we argue that this depends on the source of the parties' budgets.
If the parties' budgets are raised in an appropriate manner from voters' contributions,
or for some other reason re°ect voters' preferences, then it turns out that the party that
maximizes the total utility of the voters is the winner. We argue that, more generally,
the critical determinant of e±ciency is whether each voter turns out to be pivotal in some
non-trivial way, which occurs if voters can make campaign donations in a game that we
describe.
Finally, we also consider situations where voters' preferences are unknown to the
parties, in which case parties cannot \target"their vote buying. This also has an impact
on the outcome. For instance, in the case of vote buying changing the distribution of
preferences so that the (expected) median voter's preference for voting for one party
increases by $1 has the same e®ect on who wins as increasing that party's budget by
$N=2, where N is the number of voters.
There are several lines of related literature: the study of Colonel Blotto games, the
political science literature on lobbying (e.g., Groseclose and Snyder (1996)), campaign
promises (Myerson 1993), and vote buying (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and An-
derson and Tollison (1990)), and the ¯nance literature on corporate control and takeover
battles (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988)). Discussing why our
conclusions di®er from some of these other lines of literature will be much easier after
the presentation of our model and results, so we defer this discussion to Section 7.5.
2 A Model of Vote Buying
Two \parties," X and Y , compete in an election with an odd number, N, of voters.
As mentioned in the introduction, we may think of these parties as candidates in the
election, or in other applications as lobbyists or interest groups that compete for the
votes of legislatures.
2.1 The Vote Buying Game
Prior to the election the parties try to in°uence the voting. Parties have two methods of
in°uencing voters:
(1) Up-front payments: a binding agreement that gives the party full control of the
vote in exchange for an up-front payment to the voter.
4(2) Campaign promises: a promise that has to be honored by the party if it is elected;
the voter maintains control of the vote.2
The parties alternate in making o®ers. Party k in its turn announces the up-front
o®er pk
i ¸ 0 to voter i for her vote, and the campaign promise ck
i ¸ 0 given to voter i
if k is elected. A fresh o®er (or promise) made to a voter cannot be lower than those
previously made by the same party to the same voter. There is a smallest money unit
">0, so o®ers can only be made in multiples of ".
The parties ¯nance their up-front payments and campaign promises out of budgets
denoted BX and BY. The total of the up-front payments and campaign promises that a
party would have to pay at any stage of the game, assuming that the game were to end
at that stage and that party were to win, cannot exceed its budget. At each point in
time, given the up-front o®ers and campaign promises, there is a unique party to which
each voter will sell her vote (as we discuss in section 2.2 below). If party k's up-front
o®er pk
i has been outbid by the other party, so that at that point voter i would sell her
vote to the other party, then party k does not have to count this up-front o®er against
its budget. However, all campaign promises do need to be honored by the winner and
thus count against the budget.
The budgets might derive from the state's resources that are controlled by the winner,
or from donations.3 Either interpretation is consistent with budgets used for ¯nancing
campaign promises and up-front vote buying. We discuss these interpretations further
in section 7.1.
When a party makes o®ers and promises, it observes the past o®ers and promises
received by each voter. The preference of a party is to win at minimal cost. We can
think of this as a situation where party k's utility of winning is W k ¡ t and its utility of
losing is ¡t, where t · Bk is the total of all payments incurred by party k, and W k ¸ Bk








as the winner makes good
on campaign promises, while for the loser t =
P
i pk
i, where the pk
i's are those counted
against the budget as described above.) Without loss of generality, given that payments
must be in multiples of ", we round budgets down to the nearest multiple of " as any
remainder can never be bid. The bidding process ends when two rounds go by without
2Thus in case (1) payments are contingent on the individual's vote but not on the outcome of the
election, and under (2) the opposite holds. Another natural strategy is where payments are contingent
on both. This is discussed in Section 7.4.
3However, we do not allow parties to tax individuals if they win: campaign promises are positive and
more generally state resources and the parties' access these resources is exogenous.
5any change in who would win if the game ended at that point.4 Once the bidding process
ends, voters simultaneously tender their votes to the parties. The party that collects
more than half the votes wins.
Initially, we consider the full information version of the game where the parties'
budgets and the voters' preferences are known to the parties when they bid. Later, we
relax those assumptions.
2.2 Voter Behavior
Voters are not formally modeled as players in this game, but instead are assumed to
sell their votes according to the following simple rule. Each voter i is characterized by
parameters UX
i and UY
i that are interpreted as the utility she obtains from a victory
of X and Y respectively. If voter i faces ¯nal payment promises pk
i and ¯nal campaign
promises ck






















where ® is a parameter in (0;1].
Although the voters are not modeled here as players, the rule (1) is intended to
capture their behavior in the decision problem they would face if they were modeled as
players. The full decision problem of voter i would account for three terms: the up-front
payments, a pivot calculation, and a direct utility that i obtains from casting a vote for
party k, denoted V k
i . Speci¯cally, the voter would compare
p
X
































and sell to X if the former expression is larger than the latter. Note that the probability
of being pivotal is Pr(X wins j vote X)¡Pr(X wins j vote Y ) = Pr(Y wins j vote Y )¡
Pr(Y wins j vote X). If this probability is negligible and if V k
i is proportional to Uk
i +
ck
i, then (2) reduces to (1). Thus, using (1) to describe behavior is a simple way of
encapsulating these two assumptions. The ¯rst assumption re°ects our opinion that
endogenous pivot probabilities do not play an important role in the situations we would
4Alternatively, one could end the game when two rounds go by with no bidding activity whatsoever.
The equilibrium outcomes of that game would be the same, but there are many more equilibria in terms
of the speci¯cs of round-by-round bidding behavior, as for instance, a bidder might bid for voters a
penny at a time, rather than bidding enough to gain a majority all at once.
6like to consider. We explain this further in Section 7 by arguing that in more complete
models pivot considerations are inconsequential in this setting even when voters are fully
strategic. The assumption that V k
i is proportional to Uk
i + ck
i is not required for the
analysis. The main results can be derived using a general V k
i instead of ®(Uk
i + ck
i)i n
(1). But it seems reasonable to assume that the utility from voting is in°uenced by the
preferences over ¯nal outcomes. Expressing this relationship using a ¯xed proportionality
factor ® is just a convenient way to parameterize the strength of this in°uence.5
Allowing ® to vary from 0 to 1 allows us to assess the role of voters' preferences for
how they cast their vote, and we will see that this makes a substantial di®erence in the
outcome of the vote-buying game. In large elections where votes are cast secretly ® might
be quite small. We still take it to be a positive parameter, so that preferences over ¯nal
outcomes serve as a tie-breaker. In elections where votes are public, as in some legislative
votes or committee votes, a voter (legislator) might care signi¯cantly about how the vote
is cast regardless of outcome, and then ® would be quite large.6
Without loss of generality we set UY
i = 0 and Ui = UX
i , which of course can be
positive or negative. To avoid dealing with ties, which add nothing of interest to the
analysis, we assume that for all i, the values Ui=2 and ®Ui=2 are not multiples of ".
2.3 Equilibrium
Strategies are de¯ned in the obvious way, and the solution concept we use is subgame
perfect equilibrium. There are several facts about these equilibria that we can easily
deduce. Note that since the sum of payments guaranteed to all voters must go up
by at least " in any three consecutive rounds, the bidding process must end after a
bounded number of rounds. This is thus a ¯nite game with perfect information, and so a
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium can be found by backward induction. Thus,
equilibrium exists in pure strategies. Moreover, as ties never occur, the equilibrium
outcome must be the same for all equilibria in any subgame. This means that there are
well identi¯able winners and losers.
5Another rationale for the form ®(Uk
i + ck
i ) is that the voting preferences re°ect a possibly incor-
rect subjective probability ® of being pivotal. If we substitute V k
i = 0 and Pr(X wins j vote X) ¡
Pr(X wins j vote Y ) = Pr(Y wins j vote Y ) ¡ Pr(Y wins j vote X)=® in (2) then it also reduces to
(1).
6Speci¯cally, in the case of voting in a legislature, X and Y are lobbyists; ® is the weight the
legislator assigns to constituents' preferences (say, for reelection considerations); pk
i are the bribes o®ered
to the legislator; and ck
i are the lobbyists' promises for direct contributions (say, via projects) to the
constituents.
7Proposition 1 The vote-buying game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. In every
equilibrium the same party wins, and the losing party never makes any payment.
The proofs of all propositions appear in the appendix.
Another important observation is that the winner does at least as well when replacing
her campaign promises by equal up-front payments because the latter are not impacted
by ®; can be re-allocated if the other party outbids her, and the winner is liable for the
payments in either case.
Proposition 2 The winner in any equilibrium of the vote-buying game when both up-
front payments and campaign promises are permitted, is the same as the winner in any
equilibrium of a modi¯ed version of the game where only up-front payments are allowed.
The implication of Proposition 2 is that, at least in terms of determining who wins
the election, the relevant cases for us to consider are where only campaign promises are
allowed and where only up-front payments are allowed. Nevertheless, although contin-
gent payments are dominated as described above by up-front payments, the presence of
campaign promises can still a®ect the total payments that the winner needs to make in
equilibrium. This can be seen in the following example.
Example 1 Campaign Promises make a Di®erence in the Payments.
Consider a three voter society where " =1 ,Ui =1 =2 for each i, and BX = 90, while
BY = 30. Let ® = 1. It is easy to see that X wins in each equilibrium. There is an
equilibrium where Y sets cY
i = 10 for all i, and then X has to o®er pX
i = 10 to two voters
in order to win.
If we rule out campaign promises and only allow up-front payments, then X would
still win in all equilibria, but would never pay anything. That follows, since in order to
get X to pay something in equilibrium, Y would need to make some promises of up-front
payments. Once Y has bid, X's ¯nal purchase will involve the two cheapest voters and
Y will end up buying at least one voter even though she does not win. This cannot be
part of an equilibrium as Y could deviate and never make any payments and be better
o®. ¥
3 Campaign Promises
We begin by studying the case where only campaign promises are permitted, and up-front
vote buying is not. This serves as an important benchmark, as it is the case that applies
8to many election settings. Also, as we have seen from Proposition 2, it is the only case
where campaign promises might have a signi¯cant impact on determining who wins the
election (rather than just how much is paid).
The parameter ® is now irrelevant and voter i will vote for X i® cX
i +Ui >c Y
i . We label
voters so that Ui is non-increasing in i. Under this labeling, we refer to m =( N +1 )=2
as the median voter. Without loss of generality, suppose that the median voter is a
supporter of party X (Um > 0). Let n = jfi : Ui > 0gj be the number of a priori
supporters of X. The analogous number for Y is simply N ¡ n. Given a number z, let




i > 0 be the minimal sum that Y has to promise to voters in order
to secure the support of a minimal majority, in case X does not promise anything. Thus
T, depicted as the shaded part of Figure 1 (drawn assuming U"
i = Ui), is one possible
measure of the preference advantage that X enjoys over Y .
Figure 1:
Proposition 3 Y wins in any equilibrium if and only if BY ¸ BX + T.
This can be deduced from the proof of Proposition 4 below.
The idea behind Proposition 3 is easily explained. Party Y must spend at least T in
order to secure a majority. After that, X will try to obtain some of these votes back (or
others, if Y has overspent on these marginal votes), and the competition back and forth
will lead to the winner being the party with the largest budget once an expense of T has
been incurred by Y .
9Since the loser will not have to ful¯ll its promises, it is indi®erent among all of its
feasible promises. Therefore there will be many equilibria. However, in most of these
equilibria the loser's behavior is optimal only because it is certain to lose. Thus, if
there is any uncertainty about the relative strength of the parties, we expect that the
range of equilibrium behaviors will narrow down dramatically. Indeed, Proposition 4
below establishes that the only equilibria that survive uncertainty over the relative size
of the budgets involve \Least Expensive Majority" (LEM) strategies, in which the parties
purchase the least expensive majority in their turn. Thus, any uncertainty over budgets
rules out all the \implausible" equilibria.
Proposition 4 If BX and BY are distributed with full support over f0;";:::;B"g, then
in any equilibrium:
(i) Both parties play LEM strategies.
(ii) Y wins if BY ¸ BX+T and ends up pledging exactly BX+T, and X wins otherwise
and ends up pledging exactly maxfBY ¡ T + ";0g.
Let ^ n = fmini : Ui > ¡"g. If both parties use LEM strategies, then only voters
between m and ^ n can receive positive payments, and the total payments received are
max
©
0;BY ¡ T + "
ª
if X wins and BX + T if Y wins. That is, the winner commits "
more than the loser, who in turn commits its entire budget to a subset of these \near
median" voters. (If BY <Tthen any strategy by Y is an LEM strategy, and no payments
are made, although Y might still make promises.)
While payments are concentrated among the voters between m and ^ n, the particulars
of which voters get how much can di®er across equilibria. For example, in one equilibrium
using LEM strategies in a case where BY >B X + T, the ¯nal outcome is that Party X
ends up o®ering its entire budget BX to a single voter, say voter m, and Party Y ends
up winning by o®ering U"
m + BX to that voter and U"
i to all voters i 2 [m +1 ;n]. This
happens by having the parties repeatedly outbid each other by a minimal amount for
voter m. In another equilibrium with LEM strategies, X's budget is spread equally over
voters i 2 [m;n], and Y matches all those bids and tops them o® by U"
i to compensate
for these voters' initial preference for X.
104 Up-Front Vote Buying with Negligible Voting Pref-
erences
We now consider the situation where up-front vote buying is permitted. We can then
contrast that with the outcome where only campaign promises are allowed, to see the
impact of up-front vote buying.
We ¯rst consider the case where voting preferences are negligible, that is, where ® is
small enough so that j®Uij <" . This is a transparent case to analyze since voters view
their vote as having no consequence on its own, and thus are happy to tender to the
bidder with the highest o®er. As a result, the party with the highest budget (up to a
factor of ") wins at a negligible cost.
Proposition 5 In the small ® case, party X wins in (every) equilibrium if and only if
BX +( n ¡ m)" ¸ BY, and then X's total payments are bounded above by m®BY
m¡1 + m".
The proof (in the appendix) shows that if BX+(n ¡ m)" ¸ BY then the LEM strategy
guarantees a victory to X against any bidding strategy that Y might adopt. This implies
that, in equilibrium, Y will not enter the bidding except for possibly making o®ers that
will be outbid or campaign promises that will never be paid.
Introducing up-front vote buying when ® is negligible results in a winner determined
purely by the relative size of the budgets. This contrasts with the case where only
campaign promises are permitted, where the utility advantage of one candidate over
another, T, e®ects signi¯cantly the identity of the winner. Also, the voters get lower
payments under up-front vote buying than under competition in campaign promises.
This is because the contingent nature of campaign promises allows the loser to make
signi¯cant promises that need to be matched by the winner. In contrast, in up-front
vote-buying competition with negligible ®, the party destined to lose would just lose
money if it made signi¯cant up-front bids. As with campaign promises alone, the loser
may still make signi¯cant campaign promises, but when ® is small the winner can compete
against those with negligible up-front payments.
The conclusions of Proposition 5 are in contrast with the results of Groseclose and
Snyder (1996) who analyzed a game where each party gets to move only once, and
in sequence. Their model provides a signi¯cant second-mover advantage to one of the
parties, which contrasts sharply with the open-ended sequential nature of our game. The
small ® case here corresponds to a case with small utilities in their model, where, with
small utilities, the ¯rst mover would need a budget at least twice that of the second mover
11in order to win. The ¯rst mover needs to be able to bid in such a way that the second
mover cannot a®ord to buy any majority. In a game without an exogenously determined
last mover, as the one we analyze, if one party is (temporarily) outbid for some voter, it
can remobilize those resources, which places parties on a more equal footing.
5 Up-front Vote Buying with Signi¯cant Voting Pref-
erences.
We now study the case where ® is signi¯cant. As mentioned earlier, the case of large
®Ui's is relevant for a model of voting in a legislature in the presence of lobbying or where
voters have nontrivial preferences over how they vote|regardless of their actual impact
on the outcome.
Our main concern is which party wins the election. Therefore, appealing to Propo-
sition 2, we study the scenario where only up-front payments are possible. This scenario
is also interesting as a model of environments where campaign promises are not credible.
Besides the substantive interest in the case of signi¯cant ®, it is also somewhat inter-
esting from an analytical point of view. The identi¯cation of the winner turns out to be
harder as it entails more complicated considerations that involve both the budgets and
the preferences. Nevertheless, we can characterize the winners of this competition when
the budgets are su±ciently large (as speci¯ed below).
In this case the winner is determined by comparing Y 's advantage in the budgets
(BY ¡BX) with (approximately) one half the total utility advantage of X over Y (§i®Ui).
To understand why the utilities of all voters matter, but only count half as much as the
size of the budgets, it is useful to understand the structure of the winning strategies.
The following example contrasts the optimal strategy for the winner with the LEM (least
expensive majority) strategy, which previously seemed to be a good strategy.
Example 2 Optimal versus Naive Strategies - Why Utility has a Shadow Price of 1/2.
There are three voters with ®U1 = ®U2 =0 :5 and ®U3 = ¡30:5. The grid size is
" = 1. Budgets are BX = 100 and BY = 80.
Note that BX ¡ BY =2 0< 29:5=¡
P
i ®Ui, so the total utility advantage for Y
is greater than the absolute budget advantage of X. Nevertheless, as we show below in
Proposition 6, X should win, because X's budget exceeds Y 's budget plus half of the total
utility di®erence. That is, basically what matters is the budget advantage relative to one
12half the total preference advantage (setting aside small corrections that are explained in
the proof of the result). Let us see how X should play to win.
Suppose that X follows the naive LEM strategy of always spending the least amount
necessary to guarantee a majority at any stage. Suppose (just for the purpose of illus-
tration) that at the ¯rst stage Y makes o®ers of 55 to voter 1 and 25 to voter 3. The
cheapest voter for X to buy back is voter 1 at a cost of 55. Assume Y now o®ers 55 to
voter 2. At this point X has 45 left in her budget, and cannot a®ord to buy back either
voter 2 or 3.
What was wrong with this strategy? The problem is that, while X bought the
cheapest voter in response to Y 's o®er, X also freed up a large amount of Y 's budget
for Y to spend elsewhere, while X's budget was committed. X needs to worry not only
about what X is spending at any given stage, but also about how much of Y 's budget is
freed up. E®ectively, freeing up a unit of Y 's budget is \just" as bad for X as spending
an extra unit of X's budget.
So, instead of following the naive LEM strategy of buying the cheapest voters, let X
always follow a strategy of measuring the \shadow price" of a voter as the amount that
X must spend plus the amount of Y 's budget that is freed up.I fX had followed that
strategy, then in response to Y 's ¯rst stage o®er above, X would have purchased voter 3
at a price of 56. Then Y would have 25 free, and could only spend it on voters 1 and 2.
Regardless of how Y spends this budget, X can always buy voter 2 at the next stage at
a price of at most 25, against which Y has no winning response. ¥
The example shows that keeping track of the shadow price is a good strategy. In
fact, for large budgets it guarantees a win for the winning candidate characterized in
Proposition 6 below. Let us see how we get from this understanding of \shadow prices"
to the expressions underlying Proposition 6.
Under the strategy suggested in the above example, X keeps track of the o®er that X
has to make to buy a voter given the current o®er of Y , plus the amount of Y 's budget
that is freed up. The amount that X has to o®er to buy a given voter i when Y has
an o®er of pY
i in place is pY
i ¡ ®Ui. The amount of Y 's budget that is freed up is pY
i .
So the \shadow price" of buying voter i is 2pY




2 . In the proof this translates into the \strength" of Y being Y 's budget less the
®Ui
2 's of the majority of voters that are most favorable to Y . Similarly X's \strength" is
X's budget plus the
®Ui
2 's of the majority of voters that are most favorable to X.
This is captured in Proposition 6 below, which includes some slight modi¯cations to
account for the grid size and some other details that are covered in the formal proof.














































®Ui=2 ¡ ®UN=2+m" (5)







The interesting feature is that, very roughly, increasing a voter's preference for a given
party by $1 is equivalent, in terms of who wins, to increasing the budget of that party by
$0:5. Thus money is worth much more to a party than being liked, as might be expected
due to the use of funds being more °exible.
Note that the small ® case of Proposition 5 is a special case of the above results. With
small ®,
P
i ®Ui is negligible relative to the budgets, and the comparison boils down to
a comparison of the budgets. Moreover, then the optimal strategy simpli¯es to the LEM
strategy, which is not optimal in general. Also note that, as the proof makes clear, in
fact only one large-budget condition is needed in each case. That is wins if equations
(4) and (5) hold, and wins if (3) and (6) are satis¯ed.
The next example shows that Proposition 6 is not valid without the assumption of
large enough budgets.
Example 3 Large versus Small Budgets
Let BY =0 ,BX =3 0 :2, " =0 :1, N =3 ,®U1 = ¡10, ®U2 = ¡20, and ®U3 = ¡30.











Y ¡ m" = ¡:2;
and so if we applied the expressions from Proposition 6, we would mistakenly conclude
that Y should win. ¥
We close this section with an example showing that while voters preferences only
count half as much as monetary budgets, having minority support that is very strong
can be enough to help a candidate overcome having a smaller budget than the opposition.
14Example 4 The party with a smaller budget and minority support can win
Let BX = 200, BY = 190, N =3 ," = :1, U1 = U2 = 10, U3 = ¡60, and ® =1 .S o
X has a larger budget and starts with the support of the majority of voters. However,










Y ¡ m" = 190 ¡ :2:
Here, the strong support of the third voter for Y is a big asset. Very roughly, the game
boils down to one where X has to win the support both voters 1 and 2, while Y needs
only to get one of them.
Note that this example can be extended to the case of any number of voters, with
only one voter liking Y , and with X having a larger budget than Y . So long as the one
voter likes Y su±ciently more than any one of the others likes X, and the budgets are
large enough, Y will win.¥
6 Unknown preferences
Our analysis so far has focused on situations where the voting preferences are known. In
many cases, this is a reasonable ¯rst approximation, as voters' preferences might be highly
correlated with observable characteristics (and in such cases where parties are lobbies and
voters are legislators with voting records and known constituencies). However, there are
some cases where there may be signi¯cant uncertainty about voters' preferences and
so it is worth understanding how our results are a®ected by the introduction of such
uncertainty. In the case where ® is small (with up-front vote buying), the introduction
of uncertainty about voter's preferences will not have a signi¯cant impact, as the larger
budget will still win. However, if either ® is large, or up-front vote buying is ruled out
and only campaign promises are possible, then uncertainty can matter.
We examine the case of up-front vote buying, as with the uncertainty introduced here,
voters are essentially symmetric from the parties' viewpoint, and so now the analysis of
the case where only campaign promises are permitted is similar to that of up-front vote
buying.
Suppose that, for all i, ®Ui is an independent draw from a continuous distribution
F. We assume that F has a connected support and a continuous and positive density
on its support, such that z + F(z)=f(z) and z +( F(z) ¡ 1)=f(z) are both increasing on
the support of F. There are many prominent distributions satisfying this, such as the
15uniform distribution. Let ®¹ U = F ¡1(0:5) be the median of the distribution F. In this
environment we impose the constraint that parties' o®ers must in expectation be within
their budgets at each point in the game, assuming it ends at that point.
Proposition 7 For any ±>0, there is N(±) and ¹ " such that for all N>N (±) and all
grids with " 2 (0;¹ ") the following hold.
² If BY >B X + ®¹ UN=2+±, then Y wins with probability of at least 1 ¡ ±.
² If BX >B Y ¡ ®¹ UN=2+±, then X wins with probability of at least 1 ¡ ±.
The result is almost a complete characterization for large N, as the conditions cover
budget di®erences except those that fall in an interval of size 2±.
When ± is su±ciently small, the party who is likely to lose will not enter the bidding
and the winning party will bid the minimum necessary to secure majority with su±ciently
high probability. Thus, we again see a result that echoes the earlier result of minimal
payment with up-front buying and small ®, but now it obtains regardless of ®.
As mentioned above, Proposition 7 extends readily to the analysis of campaign
promises, where the main change is that ® drops out and F is the distribution of Ui
rather than the ®Ui's. Again the uncertainty over preferences results in a signi¯cant
change in equilibrium payments for this case.
7 Discussion
7.1 The Budgets
The analysis above treats the parties' budgets as exogenous. There are two main sources
for payments that parties may make or promise: parties' own funds (e.g., donations and
government funding) and government resources that the party controls if it wins (which
may also di®er across parties due to di®erent abilities to generate or use these resources).
Although the party takes control over government resources only after the election and
only if it wins, these resources are not only relevant for funding campaign promises. One
could also imagine parties taking loans that would be repaid using government resources
once the party took over. (In fact, one might think of some donations as implicitly
being of this nature.) The above analysis is consistent with the budget being drawn from
either of these sources or both. Of course, in an expanded model in which such loans were
determined endogenously, the availability of such loans and their terms would depend on
the winning prospects of parties. We do not explicitly analyze this extended game.
167.2 E±ciency
In the absence of any mechanism for buying and selling votes, the outcome of voting will
in general be ine±cient. There is simply nothing to make voters take into account the
e®ect of their vote on others. A natural hypothesis then might be that the opening of
trade will lead to e±cient outcomes. Our analysis shows that this is not always so. Even
if we take the budgets of the parties to represent the utility of some unmodeled agents,
the outcome of a vote-buying equilibrium is in general ine±cient. In the small ® case
of the direct purchase scenario, essentially only the budgets matter: If voters strongly
support X, but Y has a slightly larger budget, Y still wins. In the large ® case, even
if we consider the ® = 1 case in which the underlying preferences enter voting decisions
fully, the e®ect of voters' preferences is only about half that of the budgets. Finally,
in the campaign-promise scenario only the preferences of voters near the median group
a®ect the outcome, and hence the outcome does not re°ect the preferences of all voters.
Under what circumstances will vote buying result in e±ciency? We answer this with
respect to the game where up-front vote buying is allowed. Then, the equilibrium will be
(approximately) e±cient if for some reason the budgets are proportional to the true sur-
pluses. That is, let UX be X's support in terms of total utility of voters (UX =
P
i[Ui]+),
and UY be Y 's support in terms of total utility of voters (UY =
P
i[¡Ui]+), then the
equilibria will be e±cient if BX=UX = BY=UY. This would be the case, for example,
if the budgets are raised through individual donations that are somehow proportional
to values. More fundamentally, vote buying is capable of achieving e±ciency, if every
voter is made pivotal with respect to the decision. For example, if the voting mechanism
requires unanimity (say, X is the status quo outcome that would be replaced by Y only
upon unanimous approval), then when vote trading is allowed this is in fact an N-person
bargaining problem with complete information for which a wide variety of trading pro-
cedures will result in e±ciency.7 But unanimity is not necessary. Even if the simple
majority requirement is maintained, one can construct vote trading games that put a
su±cient subset of the voters in a pivotal position so as to yield the e±cient outcome.
The vote-trading game outlined below does just that. It illustrates how e±ciency is (al-
most always) attained when voters are pivotal.8 In this game the parties' budgets are
7Both Buchanan and Tullock (1960) and Neeman (1999) make this point.
8The \almost always" caveat is needed since our characterizations have some slack. For small ®,
by Proposition 5, it is only up to a factor of m" that the winner is the party with the larger budget.
Similarly for general ®, by Proposition 6, a party that provides greater total utility and has a greater
budget wins, but only up to a factor of maxf®U1;®U Ng+m", and if the budgets are large enough. For
17raised via a simple donation game that precedes the up-front vote-buying game analyzed
above. While as before the voters are not pivotal in the voting stage, the sequential
donation stage makes a su±cient subset of the voters pivotal in the donation game to
guarantee e±ciency.
The Campaign-Donation Vote-Buying Game is as follows.
(1) There is some ordering over voters, according to which voters sequentially choose an
amount to donate to each party, where voter i's donations are denoted (dX
i ;d Y
i ) 2
[0;jUij]. Donations are made in a series of rounds, and voters can increase their
promised donations in any round. Any increase must be at least in multiples of ",
or the remaining budget that a voter has if that is smaller than ". The donation
part of the game ends when there is a round with no increases in donations.9
(2) The parties' budgets are BX =
P
i dX




(3) The parties play the vote-buying game.
We ¯rst consider the small ® case.
Proposition 8 Party X wins in the campaign-donations vote-buying game if and only
if UX ¸ UY +( m ¡ n)".
We omit the proof as it is fairly straightforward. An analogous result is available for
the large ® case (and is stated at the end of the appendix).
To understand the sense in which the donation game makes voters pivotal, consider
a subgame in which Y 's supporters have already donated UY and X's supporters have
so far donated D<U Y +( m ¡ n)". Suppose that voter j is last in the sequence of X
supporters, that Uj > 0, that j has not donated yet and that D + Uj >U Y +( m ¡ n)".
Then this subgame has an equilibrium in which voter j donates at least an " to X, which
is the minimum required to keep the game moving. Thus, at this point j is made pivotal:
if she does not donate the game will end with X's loss; if she donates only part of the
large populations this factor is small compared to total utility.
9As noted, we cap voters' donations at their total utility and require minimal increases. One could
alternatively consider the in¯nite game where voters could make arbitrary increases in donations in any
given period (and would have to assign a largely negative utility to the in¯nite path where the game
never ends). In equilibrium, voters would never make payments exceeding their total utility in any case,
although they might make higher payments o® the equilibrium path. We have not explored whether
this alternative leads to di®erent outcomes.
18sum, everybody will still expect her to complete her donation in the following round. In
this manner the donation game guarantees e±ciency by designating a su±cient subset
of voters as pivotal in any subgame. Thus, if UX >U Y +( m ¡ n)", there might be
some slack and the equilibrium may place only some subset of X's supporters in pivotal
positions, but if UX = UY +(m¡n)", every supporter of X will be made pivotal at least
in some subgame (possibly o® path).
Going back to the vote buying models we have analyzed, the main source of the
ine±ciency is now clear. In those models the voters are not pivotal. Notice, however,
that this is not due to some peculiarity of those models. These models describe rather
natural processes of vote trading; and other natural models (e.g., uniform restricted price
o®ers10) would yield similar results with respect to e±ciency. As we have just seen, it
is possible to design vote-trading games, like the above campaign-donation-vote-buying
game, that make everybody pivotal. But the arti¯cial features of that game (such as the
sequential donation process played by the voters) which are necessary to make everybody
pivotal, just highlight the fact that natural processes of free bidding will not put every
voter in a pivotal position and hence are inherently ine±cient.
Does vote buying and selling entail greater welfare loss than would occur in its ab-
sence? Based on our results, we can see that it is easy to construct examples that generate
higher or lower overall utility than straight voting. What we learn from our models is
that budgets count for more than utilities. Thus, if we think of the budgets as being
raised from donations of the voters and recognize that free riding would limit the dona-
tions of small anonymous individuals, the opening of trade is likely to give an advantage
to groups of voters who are more capable of translating preferences to budgets. These
might be small numbers of wealthy individuals who care intensely about the outcome or
other groups organized in small cells with strong ties that manage to overcome free rid-
ing. (A donation game of the rough nature outlined above might be a reasonable model
for a small non-anonymous groups.) The opening of vote trading will elevate the relative
importance of such groups, but of course nothing can be said in general on whether these
biases are likely to produce lower total utility than simple voting.
7.3 Voter Behavior







is a short-cut that embodies two assumptions: First, pivot probabilities play a negligible
10See the discussion of Harris and Raviv's work in 7.3.3 below.
19role, and, second, voters have preferences over the voting itself that are in°uenced by the
preferences over ¯nal outcomes.
There are two reasons why we think that pivot probabilities should not be an impor-
tant consideration in the situations we would like to consider. First, in large elections
there is inevitably su±cient noise to make the pivot probability of an individual voter
insigni¯cant. This can be modeled formally by introducing some "noise voters" into the
model. The magnitude of such noise can be made small relative to the size of the elec-
torate, hence leaving intact the essence of the analysis conducted above. At the same
time, the noise can be signi¯cant enough to make the pivot probabilities negligible. To
see this, suppose that, in addition to the N voters we consider, there are L noise voters
each of whom votes randomly and independently with equal probability for each of the
parties. Assume also that the L noise voters are not part of vote buying process. Let N
and L be large, but L=N be very small. The large L implies a small pivot probability
for each of the N voters who participate in the buying game. The small L=N implies
that the analysis of the parties' competition over the N voters will be similar to the
above analysis, except that the winner would typically purchase more than (N +1 ) =2
votes|though still close to 50% of the total vote.
Second, pivot considerations are negligible since the winning party can eliminate pivot
considerations by buying more than the minimal majority. In particular, we argue that
at a negligible increase in cost the winning party can always act as if it were playing a
game where it needed a slight supermajority to win, and this puts a bound on the cost
associated with the game where it does not need a slight supermajority. More precisely,
suppose that the party that is to win in our model is Party X, and hypothetically consider
a game where X needs (N +1 ) =2 + 1 votes to win rather than just (N +1 ) =2. Clearly,
when N is large, the conditions under which X wins are close to those under which X
wins when it needs (N +1)=2 votes. Suppose that X still wins in this nearby game, and
let ¾X and ¾Y be corresponding equilibrium strategies such that Y o®ers no payments
on the equilibrium path (obviously there is such an equilibrium). Now let us change to
a game where X needs only (N +1 ) =2 votes to win, but where voters take into account
the correct endogenous pivot probabilities. Observe that there must be an equilibrium
in which X wins, and where the cost to X does not exceed the costs under ¾X;¾Y.T o
see this let e ¾
X and e ¾
Y coincide with ¾X and ¾Y after all histories in which X has not
deviated from ¾X; after any deviation by X from ¾X, let e ¾
X and e ¾
Y switch to (one of)
the worst equilibrium for X from that point on. Clearly, e ¾
Y is a best response to e ¾
X and
X wins with e ¾
X.I fe ¾
X is best response against e ¾
Y after any possible history, then we are
20done. If it is not, then X has a pro¯table deviation from e ¾
X after some history. Since
by construction, e ¾
X is a best response o® the equilibrium path, such a deviation might
take place only on the path. Since Y makes no o®ers on the path, this means that X
has a deviation in its ¯rst move that leads to a better outcome. But, by the construction
of e ¾
X and e ¾
Y, this means that there is an equilibrium in which X wins at a cost that is
not more than the cost when using ¾X. To sum up this argument, when N is large, even
when voters take into account pivot probabilities, there are equilibrium outcomes that
are close to the equilibrium outcomes of our model.
In fact, one can go one step further. If the parties were allowed to o®er payments
that are contingent on the number of votes they end up getting, then in all equilibria
the pivot probabilities will have no signi¯cant e®ect. The idea is as follows. Suppose
again that X can win when it needs (N +1)=2+1 votes to win and voters make no pivot
considerations, and let ¾X be a winning strategy. Let b ¾
X be just like ¾X except that
each voter is o®ered an additional bonus (slightly above her pivot utility di®erence) if she
sells to X and it ends up with exactly (N +1 ) =2 votes. Now notice that b ¾
X wins when
the required majority is (N +1 ) =2 and voters take into account pivot considerations.
Furthermore, X ends up paying exactly what it would pay with ¾X in the absence of
pivot considerations. The "bonus" simply removes the pivot consideration for the voters
and since b ¾
X ends up buying (N +1 ) =2 + 1 votes, X never pays the bonuses (although
X does pay for the extra vote purchased). This idea appears in Dal-Bo (2003).
The bottom line is that we think that, for the purposes of our analysis, it is appropriate
to abstract away from pivot considerations. We chose to do so in a straightforward
way. As the preceding paragraphs explain, this can be done in more sophisticated ways.
However, if we were to adopt one of these approaches and carry it throughout, the
complexity of the analysis would increase substantially without any gain in substance.
The second assumption embodied in the modeling of voter behavior is that they
have preferences over the voting itself that are in°uenced by their preferences over ¯nal
outcomes. As should be clear by now, this assumption is not needed for any of the
analytical results. These could be stated in terms of general voting preference functions
V k
i . However, it seems reasonable to assume that such voting preferences are in°uenced
by preferences over ¯nal outcomes. (Also, this assumption makes the comparison between
the platform promises and up-front vote buying more meaningful as similar parameters
appear in both.) Many of us vote in large elections, although we do not assign signi¯cant
probability to being pivotal. When we do so, we probably often vote according to our
true preferences over the outcomes. But since we realize that our vote carries very little
21weight, the voting preferences might be less intense than the actual preferences over the
outcomes.11 Thus, if we had to pay a thousand dollars to get to the polling station, we
may skip the voting, although we might be willing to pay that sum to get the president
we prefer. In this paper we do not try ¯nd a deep explanation for voting preferences and
their rationale. We take this behavior as given and proceed to examine its implications.
As mentioned before, when we adopt the interpretation of vote buying of legislators
by lobbyists, the prominent role of voting preferences is obvious and does not require
any justi¯cation. The same may be true in other situations where votes are public. In
large elections where votes are cast secretly, the voting preferences should probably be
thought as less signi¯cant (i.e., ® might be quite small).
7.4 Contingent Payments
Another natural form of strategy that the parties might use is one where an up-front
promise is made and a vote purchased, but where the payment o®ered is contingent on
winning. This is a sort of hybrid of campaign promises and up-front o®ers: the vote
is explicitly purchased and controlled as in the case of an up-front payment, but the
payment is contingent on winning as is a campaign promise. It is more complicated
in terms of how voters value such contingent promises, as the value of the promise is
endogenous to the equilibrium outcome.
Nevertheless, the consideration of such contingent payments in addition to up-front
purchases has little impact on the outcome of the vote buying games studied above in
the following sense. The winner has no bene¯t of using such purchases (and may have
a cost if the voters value them less, e.g., by the factor ®). For the loser, they do not
cost anything, but still the promises made cannot exceed the budget. The consequence
is that the equilibrium winner of the game where contingent payments are also allowed
turns out to be the same as when they are not considered. The only modi¯cation is
that the payments in equilibrium may change, as the loser might make some contingent
promises that end up being costless for her, but the winner ends up having to outbid
these promises in equilibrium.
Thus, all of the propositions extend to the additional consideration of contingent pay-
ments, modulo the fact that the payments by the winner might be larger in Proposition
5. (Note that Propositions 3 and 4 only consider campaign promises, and so no up-front
11Similarly, if we view ® as a subjective (incorrect) prior of being pivotal we would expect it to be
small in large elections. See also footnote 5.
22promises would be considered, contingent or otherwise.) The idea of the proof is the
following: suppose that the winner changed from X to Y due to the introduction of such
contingent promises. Then in equilibrium, any of Y 's promises turn out not to be contin-
gent. By using non-contingent promises according to the original equilibrium strategy X
can defeat Y 's strategy. While this stops short of being a proof, it provides the essential
ideas. Nevertheless, we do think it would be of interest to study such contingent vote
buying on its own. As mentioned the main di±culty then is how to appropriately model
voter behavior.
7.5 Related literature
As mentioned in the introduction, there are three literatures that have had something to
say about vote buying. Having our results as a backdrop, we can discuss and contrast
the results from those literatures with what we have shown here.
7.5.1 Colonel Blotto Games
A \Colonel Blotto Game" is one where two opposing armies simultaneously allocate
forces among n fronts. Any given front is won by the army that committed a larger
force to that front and the overall winner is the army that wins a majority of the fronts.
This model can be readily interpreted as a model of electoral competition, where each
party wins the voters to whom it made the larger promise and the overall winner of the
election is the party that managed to win a majority of the votes. Indeed formal models
of electoral competition with promises using this framework date back at least to Gross
and Wagner's (1950) continuous version of a Colonel Blotto game.
One di±culty in using the Colonel Blotto Game to deduce anything about vote buying
is that, even in the simplest setting with identical voters and candidates, such games are
notoriously di±cult to solve.12 The existing analyses are of symmetric mixed strategy
equilibria in which voters are treated identically (from an ex ante point of view) and the
parties are equally likely to win.
In an important contribution Myerson (1993) circumvents some of the technical di±-
culties of Colonel Blotto games by allowing candidates to meet the budget constraint on
average, rather than exactly, which renders the game much more tractable.13 In particu-
lar, Myerson considers a simultaneous move game that is similar to the platform game we
12See Laslier and Picard (2002) and Szentes and Rosenthal (2003) for some characterizations of equi-
libria.
13We adopt a similar assumption in our analysis of the case with uncertainty about preferences.
23analyze (where parties promise payments conditional on winning and not on individual
voting behavior), but where parties' can o®er random payments to each voter and the
payments need only meet the budget in expectation. As in the previous Colonel Blotto
literature, Myerson assumes voters and parties are symmetric, and derives a symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium in which parties exhaust their budgets. Our work di®ers
from this in two (signi¯cant) ways. First, the sequential version of our game enables us
to consider asymmetric voters and parties. This allows us to see how preferences and
budgets matter in determining who wins in the vote buying game. If we just look at
our campaign-promise game for the basis of comparison, then we can see how payments
are distributed across voters as a function of their preferences. When voter preferences
are known, then parties concentrate their competition completely on near-median voters.
When voter preferences are unknown, payments are uniform across voters.14 Second, we
allow for two types of promises. It turns out that the up-front vote buying game has
substantially di®erent outcomes and intuitions than the campaign-promises game.
7.5.2 The Political Science Literature on Vote Buying
Groseclose and Snyder (1996) present a model of vote buying in a legislature. Their model
is similar to the up-front vote buying version of our analysis, except for the distinction
that their model ends after two rounds. This drastically alters the strategic quality of the
game as in their analysis the second mover has a substantial advantage. The ¯rst mover
has to purchase a supermajority of voters in order to successfully block the response of
the second mover. Thus, for example, if all voters were indi®erent between candidates,
the ¯rst mover would need twice the budget of the second mover in order to win, since
the second mover should not be able to purchase the least expensive 50%. As is evident
from the above analysis, our more symmetric bidding process neutralizes the a®ect of the
order of moves and consequently gets signi¯cantly di®erent results both with respect to
See also Lizzeri (1999) who allows for asymmetries in the budgets to study why parties may create
budget de¯cits, and Lizzeri and Persico (2001), who study games where candidates can choose whether
or not to o®er a public good in addition to a redistribution.
Our platform game and that of Myerson are also related to an earlier literature where parties compete
in o®ering (simultaneously) redistributive platforms, where negative payments (taxation) is allowed.
This literature includes, for example, Cox and McCubbins (1986), Dixit and Londregan (1996) and
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
14In our case, this is ex post as well as ex ante: preference uncertainty substitutes for the random
payments in Myerson's game.
24the identity of the winner, and how much they pay and which voters they buy.15 There
is also theoretical and empirical literature on vote buying in popular elections. Anderson
and Tollison (1990) claim that vote buying was wide spread (though never fully legal)
in Britain and the USA prior to the introduction of secret ballots towards the end of
the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth centuries. Their main hypothesis is that the
elimination of vote buying contributed to the historical rise in government expenditures
on redistributive policies.16 Buchanan and Tullock (1962) discuss the rationale for the
prohibition of vote buying. They observe that under unanimity voting rule, free trade
in votes would lead to e±ciency. They suggest however that this might not be the case
when a simple majority rule is in force. They do not model the market for votes formally,
but argue intuitively that a perfect market for votes would lead to e±ciency, but that
imperfections are likely to arise and might preclude e±ciency. Our analysis provides
in a sense a particular formal interpretation to these ideas. Neeman (1999) points out
that, with some uncertainty over voters' behavior, pivot considerations are of marginal
importance and hence vote buying (by a single buyer) need not result in e±ciency.17
Our own analysis of e±ciency focuses on the next step|it inquires about the e±ciency
consequences of competition between vote buyers.
There are also related papers on lobbying that have roots in the common agency
literature, such as Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit
(1996), and Le Breton and Salanie (2003), among others. As such models generally look
at a single voter (the politician or agent), the complete information solutions result in
e±cient outcomes (e.g., see Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Le Breton and Salanie
15Baron (2001) analyzes a game where two competing lobbyists can make o®ers to legislators in
repeated rounds. His game di®ers from ours in that he models agenda setting and the legislative game
in much more detail (whereas we take two alternatives as ¯xed), and lobbyists pay to get their alternative
proposed in addition to buying votes to get it passed. The agenda setting part of the game enriches the
interaction substantially, but also makes it di±cult to obtain general characterizations of equilibrium.
Nevertheless, Baron obtains some interesting results on the pattern of the resulting majority and how it
relates to the proposal process. Given the di®erence in game structure and focus, his work and ours are
largely complementary.
16This observation can be related to our results concerning the comparison between competition in
direct vote buying and competition in campaign promises when vote buying is not allowed. If payments
for votes were small this would correspond to our results on large elections with and without up-front
vote buying.
17This and the point made by Buchanan and Tullock regarding e±ciency of vote trading under una-
nimity are just alternative statements of the observation we made above that trading results in e±ciency
when every voter is pivotal.
25(2003)).18 In particular the politician as well as each lobbyist ends up being pivotal; as
if some lobbyist is making a payment that is not pivotal in swaying the politician, then
they could lower their payment and not a®ect the outcome. This reinforces the idea that
the ine±ciencies that we uncovered are due to the fact that in many contexts at least
some players end up not being pivotal in a vote buying game when the vote is not by
unanimity.
There are other articles that are related in that they address the same considera-
tions that motivate us. But those discussions are so distant in terms of their focus and
framework that they should be considered largely complementary to our discussion, and
it does not seem useful to try to relate them to our analysis. For example, Kochin and
Kochin (1998) o®er a logic for the prohibition of vote buying, which is based on the costs
of buying votes and forming blocking coalitions. This, they argue, can lead to ine±cient
decisions depending on the source of costs and how they are distributed. They suggest
that in the absence of any costs, vote buying will always lead to e±cient decisions, al-
though the speci¯c vote buying process is not modeled.19 Philipson and Snyder (1996)
¯nd Pareto improvements from vote buying. They model a specialist system for vote
buying, and a one dimensional policy space, and ¯nd that, if the distribution of ideal
points is skewed enough, then the equilibrium with vote buying di®ers from the equilib-
rium without vote buying (the median ideal point). This di®erence re°ects the ability of
an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments.
7.5.3 Corporate control
The literature on corporate control (Harris and Raviv(1988), Grossman and Hart (1988))
is also related to our analysis. They examine settings in which two alternative manage-
ment teams|an incumbent and a rival|are competing to gain control of a corporation
through acquisition of a majority of the shareholders' votes. The alternative teams are
the counterparts of our parties and the private bene¯ts that these teams would extract
from controlling the corporation are the counterparts of the parties' valuations for being
elected. The model of Harris and Raviv20 (henceforth HR) has one round of bidding
18As such, the focus of many of these models has been on various distributional issues such as taxation
and redistribution, or the politics of protectionism and international trade.
19This idea is also implicit in arguments by Tobin (1970), who suggests that a market for votes would
allow power to be concentrated among the rich.
20The related model of Grossman and Hart does not seem to have an explicit equilibrium model for
the case that would be close to our model (what they call competition in restricted o®ers between parties
with signi¯cant private bene¯ts).
26by each team (like that of Groseclose and Snyder), but with an additional di®erence
that o®ers are not made to speci¯c voters21|but to the public at large|with a cap on
the number of shares that will be purchased, and then rationing if too many shares are
tendered to one of the teams. Harris and Raviv characterize an equilibrium where the
e±cient team wins; that is, the team that maximizes the total shareholder value plus the
private bene¯t of being the management team. However, that equilibrium relies critically
on every voter believing that their tendering decision will be completely pivotal, and as
such it is very fragile in the sense that any uncertainty about the number of shares,
actions of other voters, or o®ers, etc., would destabilize the equilibrium.22
We believe the Harris and Raviv game has other equilibria which are stable and can
be described as follows.23 Voters do not believe they will be pivotal and tender so as
to equate their expected revenue (price times probably of not being rationed) across the
parties. In this equilibrium the party o®ering the higher price wins (with prices on a
grid). Going backwards, this implies that in the overall equilibrium the party with the
higher budget wins (with a payment that depends on whether it moves ¯rst or second,
as in the analysis of Groseclose and Snyder (1996)).
As mentioned above, the instability of the e±cient equilibrium that Harris and Raviv
analyze seems to make it less plausible than our conjectured alternative, ine±cient, equi-
libria. One question that comes to mind is why those equilibria di®er from the Groseclose
and Snyder (1996) equilibria which have a strong second mover advantage? The answer is
that the Harris and Raviv model does not have targeted o®ers, but instead o®ers made to
voters at large, with the possibility of some rationing. The absence of targeting e®ectively
eliminates the second mover advantage (there are still some advantages of being second
mover in the amount paid in equilibrium, but not in who wins). Thus, these conjectured
equilibria would be closer to our model where there are repeated rounds and the largest
budget has an advantage. Of course, given that the Harris and Raviv model does not
have targeted o®ers, it would not permit an analysis of vote buying in the presence of
21In the corporate control model, all voters have identical preferences based on the di®erence in share
value that will be generated under the two teams.
22Their model has a continuum of voters and so is not quite a closed game theoretic model. It
appears that a large ¯nite approximation to this equilibrium could be built, but the equilibrium would
be unstable in that any shift in bidders' beliefs would lead to a change in their tendering strategies, and
thus a movement to another equilibrium in the subgame (the one conjectured next in the text).
23These are equilibria that we conjecture, but are not mentioned by Harris and Raviv. We do not
provide a formal analysis, as it would take a good deal of space to set up the model, for a relatively
tangential point.
27heterogeneous voters as we have analyzed here.
7.6 Minimal Payments
One fairly, straightforward prediction of our model is that with up-front vote-buying, no
uncertainty, and small ®, there will tend to be minimal spending in equilibrium. This
is broadly consistent with some stylized facts that we see both in political elections and
stock shares. For instance Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2002) document
the paucity of money being contributed to political campaigns and ¯nd that the largest
part of the relatively small donations to campaigns comes from individuals and has little
impact on legislator's votes (a puzzle ¯rst pointed out by Tullock (1972)). One could
view the money contributed as attempts to \buy" votes. One also sees this in the price
of stock shares, where the price of voting shares is generally similar to that of non-voting
shares (Lamont and Thaler (2001)). While our highly stylized analysis is certainly not
the only explanation for these observations, it does provide some intuition for them.
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9 Appendix
Proposition 1: The vote-buying game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. In every
equilibrium the same party wins, and the losing party never makes any payment (but may
make contingent promises that do not result in payments).
Proof of Proposition 1: The facts that the vote-buying game has an equilibrium in
pure strategies follows from the fact that this is a ¯nite game of perfect information, and
hence we can ¯nd such an equilibrium via backwards induction.
The fact that in every equilibrium the same party wins, also follows from a backward
induction argument. Each terminal node has a unique winner (as the ®Ui's are not a
multiple of " and so voters are never indi®erent), and parties prefer to win regardless of
the payments necessary. Thus, in any subgame, working by induction back from nodes
whose successors are only terminal nodes, there is a unique winner. It then follows
directly that the losing party never makes any payments, as they could otherwise deviate
to o®er nothing and guarantee no payment.
30Proposition 2: The winner in any equilibrium of the vote-buying game when both up-
front payments and campaign promises are permitted, is the same as the winner in any
equilibrium of a modi¯ed version of the game where only up-front payments are allowed.
Proof of Proposition 2: By Proposition 1, we know that there is a unique winner
in every equilibrium of the unmodi¯ed game. Without loss of generality, say that X is
the winner and Y is the loser, of the game where both forms of promises are permit-
ted. Consider a game where X is permitted to make both forms of promises and Y is
only permitted to make up-front payments. As this only imposes a restriction on Y 's
strategies, X remains the winner of all equilibria of this game.24 Next we note that there
exists an equilibrium in this game where at any node X only makes up-front payment
promises (or no promises), as at any point an up-front payment is at least as attractive
to a voter as an equivalent campaign promise and is at least as °exible for X as it is no
more binding.25 This (properly trimmed) remains an equilibrium of the game (with the
trimmed tree) where no campaign promises are permitted.
Proposition 4: If BX and BY are distributed with full support over f0;";:::;B"g, then
in any equilibrium:
1. Both parties play LEM strategies.
2. Y wins if BY ¸ BX + T and ends up pledging exactly BX + T, and X wins
otherwise and ends up pledging exactly maxfBY ¡ T + ";0g.
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is based on three lemmas. First, we characterize the
outcomes resulting when at least one player follows LEM strategies. Second, we conclude
that there is an equilibrium in which both play LEM strategies. Third, we prove that in
any equilibrium LEM strategies are played by both.
Lemma 1 1. If BY ¸ BX + T, then
24More formally, start with an equilibrium in the larger game. Trim the tree so that we eliminate any
actions of Y that result in campaign promises. By backward induction, in any subgame of the resulting
tree if X won previously, X still wins, while if Y won, then either Y still wins or else X wins. As X
won previously in the overall game, X still wins.
25To be careful, we need to keep track of Y 's responses to X's actions. However, given that Y can only
make up-front payments, using a backward induction argument we can establish that in any subgame
X's chance of winning (which is either 0 or 1 in any subgame) can only go up by a switch from a
campaign promise to an equivalent up-front payment.
31(a) If X uses an LEM strategy then with an LEM strategy Y wins and spends
BX + T.
(b) If X adopts an LEM strategy, then to win Y must spend at least BX + T.
(c) If Y uses the LEM strategy then X cannot win.
2. If BY <B X + T, then
(a) If Y uses an LEM strategy then with an LEM strategy X wins and spends
BY ¡ T + ".
(b) If Y adopts the LEM strategy then to win X must spend at least BY ¡ T + ".
(c) If X uses the LEM strategy then Y cannot win.
Proof of Lemma 1: 1a and 2a follow immediately from the nature of the LEM strate-
gies: Y initially must buy (we use the term buy to indicate voters who are convinced by
the platform to vote for the buying party) n ¡ m + 1 of the voters from m to n at cost
T; X then must buy one voter with an additional cost of " (either one of those bought
by Y or possibly n +1i fjUn+1j <" ); Y then must buy a voter back at additional cost
"; and so on. I® BY ¸ BX + T will this process end with Y winning. ¤
1b is proved by induction on BX as follows. Clearly, 1b is true for BX = 0 and any
T. Suppose it is true for BX · K and for all T, and consider BX = K + ". Let ^ T
be the sum spent by Y in its ¯rst step. Clearly, ^ T ¸ T. Following its LEM strategy
X pays some S such that " · S · ^ T ¡ T + ".I f X's budget is such that it cannot
purchase a majority then any payment more than T by Y in the ¯rst step is redundant.
Otherwise, after X's purchase, the situation is equivalent to an initial con¯guration with
T 0 = "; BY 0 = BY ¡ ^ T and BX0 = BX ¡ S ¸ BX ¡
³
^ T ¡ T + "
´
. Since BX0 · K,b y
the inductive assumption Y must spend from this point on at least BX0 + " and hence
Y 's overall expenditure will be BX0 + " + ^ T. Now, this and BX0 ¸ BX ¡
³
^ T ¡ T + "
´
imply that Y 's overall expenditure is at least BX ¡
³
^ T ¡ T + "
´
+"+ ^ T = BX +T.S o
Y cannot bene¯t from spending more than T, and as noted above can lose. (Note that
Y spending T initially is an LEM strategy for Y .) ¤
For all x, Part 2x is the counterpart of 1x. In particular, 2b is analogous to 1b.
Finally, 1c follows from 2b. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 2 LEM strategies for both parties constitute an equilibrium.
32Proof of Lemma 2: For BY ¸ BX + T,1 a and 1b of Lemma 1 imply that Y 's LEM
strategy is best response against X's LEM strategy. 1c implies that X's LEM strategy
is best response against Y 's LEM strategy. Analogously, 2a{2c of Lemma 1 imply that
X's and Y 's LEM strategies are mutual best responses when BY <B X + T.
Lemma 3 All equilibria use LEM strategies.
Proof of Lemma 3: The proof is by induction on B (the number of multiples of " that
bounds BX and BY). For B = 1 the proposition is obviously true. Suppose that it is
true for B = K; we now prove that it holds for B = K +1 .
If BY <T, then the claim follows immediately. Otherwise, in the ¯rst step Y promises
some ^ T ¸ T. The new situation then is T 0 < 0, BX0 = BX · (K +1 ) " and BY 0 =
BY ¡ ^ T · K".I f BX < jT 0j, then by de¯nition the parties follow LEM strategies
from that point on. Otherwise, to become the current winner X spends S>jT 0j. This
results in the con¯guration T 00 2 (0;S+ T 0], BX00 = BX0 ¡ S = BX00 ¡ S · K" and
BY 00 = BY 0 = BY ¡ ^ T · K". Notice that if X is playing a best response, then T 00 · K",
since if X makes T 00 =( K +1 )" then X wins at a cost that with positive probability
is higher than necessary (recall that Y 's budget was bounded by (K +1 )"). Therefore,
X's best response would result in T 00 · K".
Thus, following X's move, the inductive assumption applies and Y wins i® BY 00 ¸
BX00+T 00 at incremental cost (from here on) of BX00+T 00; X wins otherwise at incremental
cost of BY 00¡T 00+". Translating this to the original data, Y wins if BY ¡ ^ T ¸ BX¡S+T 00,
in which case its overall expenditure (from the start) will be BX ¡ S + T 00 + ^ T, and X
wins if and only if BY ¡ ^ T<B X ¡ S + T 00, in which case its overall expenditure will
be max
©
BY ¡ T 00;0
ª
+ S + ". Observe that, subject to the constraint S ¸j T 0j, X's
winning probability is maximized and its expected expenditure is uniquely minimized at
S = jT 0j, which is exactly what is required by an LEM strategy for X. Now, going back
to Y 's ¯rst move, this implies that Y will win i® BY ¡ ^ T>B X + T 0, at overall expense
of ^ T + BX ¡j T 0j¡". Now, subject to the constraint ^ T ¸ T, Y 's winning probability is
maximized and its expected expenditure is uniquely minimized at ^ T = T, which again
corresponds only to LEM strategies for Y .
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
Proposition 5: In the small ® case, party X wins in (every) equilibrium if and only if
BX ¸ BY +(m ¡ n)". In any equilibrium where X wins, its total payments are bounded
above by m®BY
m¡1 + m".
33Proof of Proposition 5: By Proposition 2, we can determine the winner by examining
the game with only up-front payments. We then come back to bound the winner's
payments in the game where campaign promises are also possible.
Suppose that BX ¸ BY +( m ¡ n)". We show that then X has a strategy that
guarantees a win. As a symmetric argument applies to show that Y wins if BX <
BY +( m ¡ n)", this implies the if and only if statement. We show that the LEM
strategy whereby in each stage of the bidding X acquires the least expensive available
smallest majority (i.e., m voters), and purchases voters who prefer Y whenever the cost
is the same, guarantees a victory to X against any bidding strategy that Y might adopt.
This implies immediately that, in equilibrium, Y will only make o®ers if she expects X
to overbid all her o®ers. As X bids for only the least expensive voters this can occur only
if n · m. In this case X will have spend at least "(m ¡ n) to purchase the majority.
There are equilibrium in which X spends up to "m. In these equilibria Y bids " for up
to n voters i for which ®Ui > 0, and X buys them back.
We now argue that X wins with the LEM strategy above. A \current winner" at
a point in the bidding process will refer to the party that would win if the process
terminated at that point, and an \active o®er" will refer to an o®er that would be taken
by a voter in the equilibrium of the selling game that would be played if the process
were stopped at that point. Observe that if Y is the current winner and has a sum B
committed in active o®ers, then X has to commit at most B +( m ¡ n)" to become a
current winner. To see this suppose that Y is the current winner, let pY be the mth
highest active o®er that Y has outstanding, where we rank voters with identical o®ers
from Y higher if they prefer Y to X, i.e., if Ui < 0. Let voter j be the target of that lth
highest o®er. Let pX be the highest active o®er that X must have in order to become
the current winner in the least expensive way, and let voter i be the target of that o®er.
If Uj > 0 then pX · pY for otherwise, it would be cheaper for X to acquire j's vote
instead of i's vote. (Recall that when faced with the same o®ers the voter sells to her
preferred party.) Since to become current winner X needs only m active o®ers, it follows
that its cost would be at most pXm · pYm · B, where pYm · B since to be a current
winner Y must have at least m active o®ers with pY being the mth highest o®er.
If Uj < 0 the argument is similar, but requires a little care in counting. In this case
assume that k · n of the voters who prefer X have active o®ers from Y . By the ranking
described above, these voters have an o®er of at least pY +". Now consider those voters
not receiving any of the m highest active o®ers from Y . These include n ¡ k voters
who prefer X and whose o®ers from Y must be at most pY ¡ ". Therefore to purchase




m ¡ (n ¡ k)", where pYm + k" · B, since to
be a current winner Y must have at least m active o®ers with pY being the mth highest




m ¡ (n ¡ k)"
= pYm + "(m ¡ (n ¡ k)) · B ¡ k"+ "(m ¡ (n ¡ k)) = B + "(m ¡ n).
This implies that, when X follows that LEM strategy, it can always outbid Y to
become the current winner. Since the bidding process must end after a bounded num-
ber of rounds, X must win. Since X must buy m ¡ n votes, she must spend at least
maxf(m ¡ n)";0g.I f Y makes an o®er to any of the votes that X purchased, then it
would cost X more to repurchase that vote than to purchase a di®erent one, and after
X's purchase of a di®erent vote Y will eventually lose and have to pay something, which
is worse for Y than not purchasing in the ¯rst place (by hypothesis) so in equilibrium Y
will not purchase back a vote that X purchased. If Y purchases a vote from i such that
Ui > 0 then X is indi®erent between purchasing this vote back at cost " and purchasing
a di®erent vote from j with Uj < 0, so, as noted, there is an equilibrium where Y o®ers
" to some of the n · m voters and X purchases them back, leading to total cost of up
to m".
Now, let us come back to bound the payments that X makes when X wins in the
game where both up-front payments and campaign promises are possible. X can still
follow an LEM strategy, and that will still win. As Y surely loses, Y will not be making
any binding up-front payments in equilibrium. Thus, consider the ending promises that
are made by Y . It must that X has bought a least expensive majority, meaning that the
maximum price paid for any voter in this majority is at most the minimum price of the
voters not purchased. Any promises made by Y to the voters that X did not purchase
must have been made in the form of campaign promises. The highest the minimum cost
could be is then ®BY
m¡1 + ". The claimed expression then follows directly.







®Ui=2 ¡ ®UN=2+m" (4)







Proof of Proposition 6
We prove the following result, which implies Proposition 6.




















































We show that X has a strategy that guarantees that X wins if (3) and (5) are satis¯ed.
The other case is analogous.
Party X can guarantee a win using the strategy we describe next. Have X allocate
o®ers as follows. Let t be the period. X will identify a set of voters St to \ buy" that
has cardinality exactly m. X will make the minimal necessary o®ers to buy these votes.
To complete the proof we need only describe how X should select St, and then show
that if X has followed this strategy in past periods, then X will have enough budget to
cover the required payments regardless of the strategy of Y .
Let pY
i be the current o®er that Y has to voter i. Set this to 0 in the case where Y
has never made a viable o®er to the voter, or in a case where X already has the best
standing o®er to the voter. Similarly de¯ne pX
i .
X selects to whom to make o®ers by looking for those with that minimize the sum
of what X has to o®er, plus what o®ers of Y 's that X frees up. In particular, let St be
the set of voters than minimizes
P
i2St 2pY
i ¡ ®Ui. This is equivalent to choosing the m







In the case where there are some i's that are tied under the above criterion, let X
lexicographically favor voters with lower indices. To complete the proof, we simply need
to show that this strategy is within X's budget in every possible situation, presuming
that X has followed this strategy up to time t.26
26This implies the proposition, as it means that either Y will not respond and the game will end with
X the winner, or else X will get to move again and can again follow the same strategy. As the game
must end in a ¯nite number of periods, this implies that X must win.











¤+ captures the fact that it could be that pY
i <® U i in which
case no o®er is necessary.
The amount that must be o®ered to a voter can only rise or stay constant over time,
and so if some voters were \ purchased" by X in the past and have not been subsequently
purchased by Y , then these voters are still among the cheapest m available in the current
period time and would still be selected under X's strategy (including the lexicographic
tie-breaking).




If there are several voters tied for this distinction, pick the one with the lowest index.







, and let St be the complement of St union fi¤g.























for each i 2 St.
Equations (7) and (8) imply that the amount required by X to follow this strategy














If we can get an upper bound on the expression pY
i¤ ¡
®Ui¤
2 , then we have an upper
bound on how much X has to pay. So we want to maximize pY
i¤ ¡
®Ui¤








2 for every i= 2 St,
(2) pY


























2 for each i= 2 St. (This is feasible due to the lower
bound imposed on BY; it is not necessarily feasible for BY, but still gives a bound).































Substituting for xY from (10), this becomes
B












which has an upper bound when i¤ = N, and which then yields the claimed expressions
by substituting the de¯nition of BY.
Proposition 7: For any ±>0, there is N(±) and ¹ " such that for all N>N (±) and all
grids with " 2 (0;¹ ") the following hold.
² If BY >B X + ®¹ UN=2+±, then Y wins with probability of at least 1 ¡ ±.
² If BX >B Y ¡ ®¹ UN=2+±, then X wins with probability of at least 1 ¡ ±.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Lemma 4 Suppose that Party Y o®ers a constant price x to all voters, such that 1 >
F(x) > 0. The least expensive way for Party X to assure itself expected share ¾ 2 [0;1]
of the vote would be o®ering a constant price to all voters. The same is also true with
the roles reversed.
38Note that we do not assume here that the constant price o®ered by X is a multiple
of ". If that constraint were added, then the cost to X of obtaining a share ¾ would be
at least as high (and might involve a di®erent strategy).
Proof of Lemma 4: The problem of ¯nding bids pX
i that Party X can make to assure













1 ¡ F(x ¡ p
X
i ) ¸ N¾;p
X
i ¸ 0: (11)
The ¯rst order conditions to (11) can be written as
p
X
i f(x ¡ p
X







i ) ¡ ¹i =0 : (12)
where ¸ and ¹i are nonnegative multipliers.
Given that the support of F is connected and f is positive on F's support, we have
three possible ranges for solutions to (12): one where f(x¡pX
i )=0a n dF(x¡pX
i )=0 ,
one where f(x ¡ pX
i ) > 0 and 0 <F (x ¡ pX
i ) < 1, and one where f(x ¡ pX
i )=0a n d
F(x ¡ pX
i ) = 1. The ¯rst order conditions cannot be satis¯ed in the ¯rst case, unless
¹i = 1 in which case the non-negativity constraint is binding and pX
i = 0. However,
by hypothesis, 0 <F (x ¡ 0), which is a contradiction of the presumption of the case
that F(x ¡ pX
i ) = 0. In the third case, for f(x ¡ pX
i ) = 0 and F(x ¡ pX
i ) = 1 to hold,
since 1 >F (x) it must be that pX
i < 0. However, this cannot be a solution given the
non-negativity constraint. Thus all possible solutions must fall in the second case. In
the second case, in order to satisfy the ¯rst order conditions, it must be that pX
i · ¸
N. [If
¹i = 0 then this is clear since (1¡F) > 0. If ¹i > 0, then the constraint that pX
i ¸ 0 must
be binding, in which case pX
i = 0 and again pX
i · ¸
N.] For this case, since f(x¡pX
i ) > 0,
















Suppose that there are two solutions, pX
i and pX
j to (13) in this range. Without loss of
generality, letting zi = x ¡ pX
i >z j = x ¡ pX






















Since z ¡ (1 ¡ F(z))=f(z)=z +( F(z)) ¡ 1)=f(z) is increasing (in this range where
f(z) > 0), it follows that 0 = ¹i <¹ j. (Note that ¹i takes on only two values.) But this
implies pX
j =0<p X
i , which contradicts the fact that zi >z j.
39Thus we have shown that any solution to (11) necessarily has identical prices o®ered
to all agents.















i ¡ x) ¸ N¾;p
X
i ¸ 0;












i ¡ x) ¡ ¹i =0 :
Working through similar cases as those above, and this time using the fact that z +
F(z)=f(z) is increasing on the support of F, yields the same conclusion. ¤
Lemma 5 If (0:5+´)N[ BX
(0:5¡´)N +F ¡1(0:5¡´)] <B Y, then Y can obtain expected share
(0:5+´) of the vote at each stage. Similarly if, (0:5+´)N[ BY
(0:5¡´)N ¡F ¡1(0:5+´)] <B X,
then X can obtain a share of (0:5+´) at each stage.
Proof of Lemma 5: We show the ¯rst claim, as the second is analogous. Suppose that
it is Y 's turn. If Y can o®er all voters the same price p = BX=(0:5¡´)N +F ¡1(0:5¡´),
then Y can win in one step. This is so since, by the previous claim, X's least expensive
way of getting at least (0:5 ¡ ´)N is by o®ering the same price to all voters. A constant
price that su±ces here is BX=(0:5 ¡ ´)N which exactly exhausts X's budget (ignoring
the constraint that X must make o®ers in multiples of ", and more than exhausts it if the
constraint is taken into account). Now, since BX 0:5+´
0:5¡´ +(0:5+´)NF¡1(0:5¡´) <B Y, the
price p is feasible for Y when only (0:5+´)N voters (or slightly more) accept it. Thus,
if p is infeasible at that stage, then there are more than (0:5+´)N voters who would
prefer to sell to Y at that price. But this means that there is a lower price p0 <pthat
gives Y an expected majority of (0:5+´)N. Since (0:5+´)Np0 < (0:5+´)Np < BY,
the price p0 is feasible. Clearly, if p0 is not a multiple of " then for any " small enough
there is a p00 that is slightly larger that also gives Y an expected majority of (0:5+´)N,
and for a small enough grid size still more than exhausts X's budget. ¤
We now show (1) and (2) of the proposition. We concentrate on (1), as the other
case is analogous, given the lemmas above. For ±>0, there exists su±ciently small
´>0 such that (0:5+´)N[ BX
(0:5¡´)N + F ¡1(0:5 ¡ ´)] <B X + ®¹ UN=2+±: Therefore, if
´ is su±ciently small, BY >B X + ®¹ U=2+± together with Lemma 5 imply that Y can
obtain an expected share of (0:5+´). When N is made su±ciently large (here we mean
that BX and BY increase proportionately with N), an expected share of (0:5+´) means
40an arbitrarily large probability of winning. Therefore, there exists N(±) such that, for
N>N (±), Y 's winning probability is above 1 ¡ ±.
This complete the proof of Proposition 7.
Proposition 9 Suppose that UX satis¯es (3) in the place of BX, and UY satis¯es (4)








and Y wins if
U
X ¡ U




The proof of Proposition 9 is an easy extension of the proof of Proposition 8, and
is again omitted, noting simply that the above equations follow from (5) and (6) and a
maximum willingness to donate of Ui, and that
P
i ®Ui = ®(UX ¡ UY).
41